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14

Episode 14

44 minutes

Kate Bronfenbrenner on the UAW Stand-Up Strike

Cornell ILR's Kate Bronfenbrenner has tracked NLRB elections for thirty years. We walk through what made the 2023 UAW Big Three strike different — Shawn Fain's rolling strike strategy, the cost-of-living adjustment recovery, the 25% wage gain — and what it tells us about whether the labor revival can survive without legal reform.

Episode notes only. Audio production is in progress for this episode — the notes below are the working brief.

The Stand-Up Strike

The 2023 UAW negotiation with Ford, GM, and Stellantis was the most successful US labor negotiation in decades. Shawn Fain's leadership, in his first contract negotiation as UAW president, broke from forty years of pattern bargaining and produced a contract that exceeded what most analysts believed was achievable.

The Strategic Innovation

The "stand-up strike" tactic was the central strategic innovation. Rather than calling a full strike against all three companies — which would have rapidly depleted the union's strike fund — Fain announced selective walkouts at specific plants and parts depots that escalated over time. The first walkouts on September 14, 2023, were at one assembly plant per company plus several parts distribution centers. Subsequent waves added more plants. The escalation was designed to apply maximum pressure on the companies while minimizing the financial drain on the union.

The tactic worked. The companies began making meaningful concessions within two weeks. By the end of October, all three had reached tentative agreements with the union. The strike funds remained largely intact for future fights.

The Contract Terms

The agreed contracts included:

  • 25% wage gains over four-and-a-half years (substantially more for the lowest-paid workers).
  • Restoration of cost-of-living adjustments eliminated in 2007 concessions.
  • Elimination of two-tier wage systems for new hires.
  • Conversion of all temporary workers to permanent status with full benefits.
  • Right to strike over plant closures and layoffs.
  • Joint commitments on EV transition employment.
  • Battery-plant workers integrated into the master agreement.

The contract did not win everything the union sought. The pension restoration for new hires that the union demanded was not granted — new hires remain in 401(k) plans rather than defined-benefit pensions. The four-day workweek that some had pushed for was not adopted. Retiree healthcare for new hires remains unfunded.

But within the framework of what is achievable in current US labor law, the contract is the strongest outcome the UAW has produced in forty years. The roughly 67% ratification vote across the three companies reflected widespread membership approval.

What Bronfenbrenner's Work Suggests

Cornell ILR's Kate Bronfenbrenner has tracked NLRB elections and organizing campaigns for over thirty years. Her empirical work has documented several patterns relevant to the 2023 UAW success:

First: organizing wins correlate with strategic preparation, not with general labor-market conditions. Tight labor markets do not reliably produce organizing wins; effective campaign design does.

Second: militant tactics work when paired with patient organizing. The "stand-up strike" was not a one-off tactic; it was the visible part of a multi-year preparation effort that included internal democratization, member education, and strategic targeting.

Third: contracts depend on bargaining power, and bargaining power depends on the credible threat of disruption. The UAW's ability to shut down specific plants on short notice produced the leverage that forced concessions. Unions without comparable disruption capacity cannot win comparable contracts.

Fourth: the spillover effects matter. The UAW contract has produced wage pressure on non-UAW automakers (Toyota, Honda, Hyundai, Tesla) that have responded with substantial wage increases of their own to avoid organizing pressure. The aggregate wage effect of the contract is therefore much larger than the UAW-member-only number suggests.

The Volkswagen Chattanooga Win

The May 2024 successful organizing of the Volkswagen Chattanooga plant — the first successful unionization of a non-Big-Three southern auto plant — was the direct consequence of the Stand-Up Strike contract. Workers at non-Big-Three plants saw what the union could deliver, which made organizing more attractive than the company's existing wage and benefits.

The Mercedes-Benz Vance, Alabama vote two weeks later was unsuccessful. The mixed Southern record reflects the variability of employer anti-union campaigns and local political conditions. The broader pattern — that the UAW contract has shifted what southern auto workers believe is achievable — is real even when individual votes go against organizing.

The EV Transition Question

The auto industry's EV transition is the structural issue that the contract had to address. Battery production is less labor- intensive than internal combustion engine production. EV assembly is also somewhat less labor-intensive. If the transition shifts auto production to facilities outside the master agreement, the UAW's representation share shrinks.

The contract addressed this through:

  • Joint commitments on battery plant location and workforce.
  • The right to organize battery plants without company neutrality.
  • Reopener provisions if EV production geography shifts significantly.
  • Wage parity requirements between EV and ICE production.

Whether these provisions hold as the transition accelerates is the test for the next decade. The companies have substantial flexibility in where they locate new EV and battery facilities, and the union's leverage depends on its ability to organize at those new sites.

Whether the Revival Holds

The 2022-2025 labor revival is real and is producing measurable wage gains in unionized sectors. The structural obstacles — labor law, employer power, geographic dispersal — remain. Whether the revival becomes a generational labor recovery or remains a contained moment depends on factors largely outside any single union's control.

The legal framework matters most. The PRO Act, which would address several structural obstacles (card-check, captive-audience meetings, gig-worker classification), has not passed the Senate. Without it, the post-1947 framework continues to constrain organizing in predictable ways.

The political coalition for labor reform has been growing. The 2020s have produced more bipartisan rhetoric supporting workers, even when the legislative votes do not follow. Whether the rhetoric translates to actual legal change is the institutional question for the second half of the decade.

Reading List

  • Kate Bronfenbrenner's ongoing NLRB election research at Cornell ILR
  • Steven Greenhouse, Beaten Down, Worked Up (2019)
  • Jane McAlevey, A Collective Bargain (2020)
  • Erik Loomis, A History of America in Ten Strikes (2018)
  • Hamilton Nolan's labor reporting at In These Times